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From Worshipping Ancestors to Respecting Senior Citizens 
Michael SINGLETON
Summary: (Re)presenting the ethnographic evidence (as missionaries and anthropologists have 
tended to do) in terms of “ancestor worship” and consequently as a form of (primitive) religion 
could be yet another example of an excessively ethnocentric interpretation of what, in this instance 
and from a purely phenomenological point of view, plausibly amounts to nothing much more than 
the ceremonious recognition of the indispensable role senior citizens played in the survival of 
pre-modern rural communities. Redeining religion as “obligatory but asymmetrical reciprocity 
long expressed in interlocutory interaction” enables one to make suficiently satisfactory sense 
of the data upstream of the western divide between the sacred and the profane. 
Keywords: ancestor worship, senior citizens, intergenerational relations, religious respect.
Résumé : L’élaboration de l’évidence ethnographique typique du monde missionnaire et 
anthropologique d’antan en termes d’un culte des ancêtres et d’une forme de religiosité 
primitive pourrait n’être qu’un exemple de plus d’une lecture excessivement ethnocentrique 
d’un ensemble de phénomènes qui ne parlent en l’occurrence de manière plausible que de la 
reconnaissance cérémonieuse due à des « senior citizens » en tant que porteurs primordiaux de 
la survie collective typique des communautés rurales pré-modernes. En déinissant la religion 
comme « une réciprocité obligatoire mais réciproque longtemps exprimée par des interactions 
interlocutrices » permet de se faire une idée des données de terrain en amont de la dichotomie 
occidentale entre le sacré et le profane.
Mots-clefs : culte des ancêtres, sentior citizens, rapports intergénérationaux, respect religieux.
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At 75, before becoming a still life, it is perhaps time, while still living ancestor, 
to say my last word on the so called (but badly so to my mind) “primitive worship 
of ancestral spirits”. The issue has constituted a constant if not central concern of an 
anthropology I have made my own and which with hindsight I feel to have been just as 
liberating in intent as the theology of the same name (Singleton 2011a). Though they 
sought to sow therein the seeds of some sociological sense, my irst publications about 
“ancestor worship” appeared in the ield of (pastoral) theology (Singleton 1977b). A 
second series addressed itself, now in purely psycho-sociological terms, to geriatric 
issues (Singleton 2002b, 2003). Then having at last realized that the real is at once 
relational but asymmetric and that reciprocity takes place against an allological rather 
than an egological backdrop and that consequently recognition by others (Recherches 
Sociologiques 1992; MAUSS 2004) is more fundamental than self-identiication, my 
latest and probably last contribution to the issue addressed itself to the intergenerational 
(Singleton 2008). These paradigm shifts involving changes in belief and behavior are 
the subject of this contribution.
While having made summary ield trips to China and Vietnam and not being entirely 
ignorant of the literature ad hoc (Bontinck 1962; Jordan 1972; Wolf 1974; Smith 1974; 
Gasbarro 2009), it is with the typical African case that I am most familiar. The earliest 
expatriate observers of the African scene could not fail to notice that at a certain moment, 
their elderly household host, deposited a sliver of meat or poured out a drop of beer 
onto a potsherd placed within a miniaturized dwelling close to the compound’s main 
hut, holding intercourse all the while with a seemingly invisible interlocutor. Though 
the relationship which manifestly met the eye amounted to no more than “speaking to 
the ancestors” (Singleton 2009b), most Europeans jumped to the conclusion that they 
had witnessed an act of Ancestor Worship, had ascertained a fact of Primitive Religion.
Accepting (dato non concesso) that this fact was one of fresh knowledge (rather 
than of an integral experience in which the notional element is but an analytical 
abstraction), the outside observer had found himself in a situation similar to that of 
radical translation described by Quine (1960): the reaching out from what you already 
know to what another knows but which is as yet unknown to you. The credibility of 
your conclusion – “the native knows X” – depends largely on the concrete continuity 
between X and the element in your knowledge on which you have chosen to align it. 
When, to borrow Quine’s example, an interlocutor whose language you ignore, but who 
is clearly on the points of shooting what you call a rabbit, says gavegai it would be an 
excessive escalation were you to translate the word as “God”. 
My thesis here is that in representing dealings with the departed in terms of what 
their own culture took to be religious belief and behavior, western anthropologists 
started out on what Ricoeur (1975) would have called the wrong metaphorical foot. 
Let me immediately say which foot I consider would have been the right one. Some 
years ago, my elderly neighbor, a retired agricultural labourer, watched me struggle 
for hours trying to extract a recalcitrant concrete pole deeply embedded in clayey soil. 
He eventually hinted I should pour water into the hole. Despite feeling it would only 
make things worse, I do so – the pole came out like a knife from butter. My father-in-
law once saw me sweating over large screws: he suggested I dab the tips with oil – 
the screws sank into the wood like knives in butter. I have come to realize that such 
experiences afford metaphorical material capable of making far more plausible sense 
239Civilisations vol. 63 nos 1-2
From Worshipping Ancestors to Respecting Senior Citizens
of what was afoot and going forward in the phenomena which most western observers 
have instinctively interpreted as expressions of primitive religion. 
From data to facts
Though neuro-physiologically they have to do with basically the same sensations 
and even perceptions as those I experience when seated at my table, a Pygmy or an 
Eskimo, arriving for the irst time in the western “world” (taking the word in the sense 
of Merleau-Ponty’s monde), would quite rightfully from their point of view conclude to 
a badly made hut or a weirdly constructed igloo. Likewise a Savoyard guide who had 
just lost his son on the slopes of Mont Blanc would henceforth have to do with quite 
another mountain than that of his more fortunate neighbor. Neither an artifact, such as 
a table, nor a natural object, such as a mountain, are of themselves possessed ab ovo of 
a universal and univocal signiication. Hence, substantially the same material realities 
(be they cultural or natural) give rise to signiicant realizations which are not only 
speciic to inculturated individuals but can proved irreducible and even incompatible 
the ones to the others. Far from being “already out there now for real”, simply awaiting 
their complete and correct re-production in an observer’s passively receptive mind, 
facts or facta are meanings to be “made up” (facere “to made”) out of “givens” or data 
(dare “to give”). 
Between the data and the (factum) or “fact” of “ancestor worship” there yawns as I 
see it a credibility gap which need not have been crossed. The potential of the data (f)
actualized as “ancestor worship” can rise to less ethnocentric thoughts. Believing is no 
seeing. Meanings are to be made and not discovered. In the last analysis, the solidity 
of the signiications thus constructed (table, mountain, Waterloo or primitive religion) 
depends on criteria whose credibility answers to the causes and conventions certain 
actors of a particular culture at a given moment esteem worthwhile defending. 
Take for instance the phenomenon of “spirit” possession. The elderly Dutch White 
Father who taught me Swahili and the even older Tanzanian priest of Inyonga parish 
to which the WaKonongo belonged, were both as equally aware as I was, of how the 
women possessed behaved: heaving and grunting, they fell convulsively to the ground 
eventually voicing the demands of their majini and mashetani (Singleton 1977a). 
However, though all three of us had basically to do with the same data what we made 
of them differed quite radically. For the skeptical Dutchman, there being, to his mind, 
no real ire, the smoke would dissipate as soon as psychotherapeutic treatment was 
available for the benighted savages in question. For the Tanzanian, still substantially 
steeped in the scholasticism of seminary training undergone in the 1930s, the very Fires 
of Hell burnt in Inyonga. For him the women implicated, rather than choosing to form 
a satanic sect headed by WaKamando, the wife of a former catechist, should have had 
recourse to an ecclesiastically approved exorcist. For my part, convinced there could be 
no smoke without a ire but also that the lames were psycho-sociologically produced, 
I took to participating actively in dealing with the spirits since they not only expressed 
situations of intergenerational and intersexual stress but contributed to their satisfactory 
solution. Amongst other things, the spirits with whom I dealt, restored the pecking 
order in a polygamous household, allowed an adolescent to refuse the aging iancée her 
parents had willed upon her and enabled a young wife to winkle out a new dress from 
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her reticent husband’s savings. In not one of the many cases in which I was involved 
did I experience the need to invoke the existence of the Devil, of that metaphysical 
monster medieval theologians whose existence they believed could be read between the 
lines of the ethnographic materiel contained in the Bible – a reading contradicted by the 
irreducible complexity of the data in question (Schärf 1948). As WaKamando herself 
protested to me: “What I am doing has nothing to do with religion as you understand it 
but is merely a job like any other – Sio dini, ni kazi tu”. 
These three “(f)actualisations” of materially identical ethnographic evidence are not 
complementary, they are contradictory. Likewise substantially similar data bearing on 
the belief and behavior with regards the departed have given rise to the three contrasting 
“(f)actualisations” to be examined here. 
1. Ancestors as Saints and Holy Souls
Even before the Reformation declared that fallen humanity could never of itself 
reach up to God, Christianity had long been in two minds as to the value of non-
Christian faiths: was the soul “naturally Christian” as Tertullian suggested (anima 
naturaliter Cristiana) or had the Devil, as Justin the Martyr claimed, even gone so far 
as to create counterfeit simulacra of the sacraments? None the less, bent on adapting 
and inculturating the nonnegotiable supernatural hard core (depositum idei) of divine 
Revelation, the more irenic and ecumenically minded amongst modern missiologists 
espied in certain elements of animistic manism, possible stepping stones towards the 
dogmatic tenets and liturgical practices of the True Faith. For instance, in worshipping 
their ancestors, non-Christians, it was thought, be they as highly civilized as the Chinese1 
or as primitive as most Africans were deemed (if not doomed) to be, instinctively, albeit 
implicitly, witnessed to two supernaturally conirmed truths. Firstly, they articulated a 
desire for Eternal Life reserved for those who had proved themselves morally it while 
on Earth, and, secondly, in imploring ancestral spirits to intercede with the High God, 
they had anticipated the intercessory role played by Saints (and especially the Virgin 
Mary) and even the Holy Souls in Purgatory2. 
To say the least, things theological and anthropological have radically changed 
even since the middle of the last century. On the one hand, at present no Christian 
believer in his right critical mind would adhere lock, stock and barrel, to the letter 
of the faith his Fathers held ifty years ago. On the other, few historians of religion 
and even less anthropologists now imagine that their data speak even latently of such 
traditional Judeo-Christian things as a Subsistent Being or an individually immortal 
1  For the lucid refusal on the part Chinese intellectuals of what the West had then to offer in the way of 
religion and monotheism, cf. Gernet (1982) and for resistance to Christianity in general, cf. Pirotte 2004. 
2  Books about the power of the dead in Purgatory and Heaven were still popular during the irst half of 
the last century (at least twenty thousand copies were printed of the one written by the Archbishop of 
Cambrai (Chollet 1937) and in addition to catholic guilds intent on guaranteeing a Good Death to their 
members, there were even Archconfraternities disinterestedly dedicated to paying for masses intended to 
expedite the deliverance of souls abandoned (“délaissées”) in the purifying ires of Purgatory of souls – 
that of Our Lady of Montligeon boasted in 1902 that, in addition to the seven masses celebrated weekly 
for the deceased and the three monthly ones for forgotten sacerdotal souls, its members contributions had 
enabled 219,187 extra masses to be said for the departed (document in my possession).
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soul. Though in the sixties I had already been struck by the fortuitous convergence 
between the seemingly suicidal “Death of God Theology” and the remoteness of the so 
called African High God (Singleton 1972), this is not the place to dwell on the impact 
secular theology and political theology have had on the ideology and institutions of 
contemporary Christianity. More to our present point is an increasing awareness of 
the “anthropological” abyss opening up between the ethnographic evidence and 
missiological lucubrations. 
In the irst place, if the phenomenon under study was truly redolent of individual 
spiritual immortality, apart from the fact that this belief itself is far more classical than 
biblical, then there should logically have been a shrine for every departed person (male 
or female, young or old, native or stranger) and not, as was the case, for just a select few 
of elderly males. For, generally speaking, “shrines” were dedicated to the odd patriarch 
who, having been particularly dificult to manage in his dying days had, often on a 
diviner’s recommendation, been returned home “ritually” from the nearby ancestral 
village. Having him thus once again conveniently and tangibly close to an appeasing 
hand enabled his descendants to avoid unwittingly treading on his cantankerous toes. 
What was thus brought back or came back of its own accord is a moot point and one 
which, even supposing those most concerned had given it much thought, can only be 
resolved in terms of the human logic prevailing locally. This latter (sometimes counting 
as many as nine component human parts) was never as dualistically simplistic as 
the body/soul, matter/spirit, time/eternity divide under which most expatriate minds 
labored. 
In Africa, moreover, the Beyond was never the Above – the totally different and 
purely spiritual if not theocentric world, to which the disembodied soul of the western 
tradition departed with a sigh of relief. Neither Hades nor Heaven, the ancestral village 
to which departing Africans retired to carry on life more or less as usual, was often 
within walking distance of the one they had left behind. If myths mirrored a rather 
different world at the beginning, once the present had been stabilized, no African 
believed another quite other would one day take its place. Even if this one world was 
tiered, it was not torn between Time and Eternity. Whatever might have been the case 
before Paradise was lost, no collective and even less; sensual activities are programmed 
in that regained by the predestined few of Christian theology. In oral cultures, rather 
than to be passively seen forever, “gods” are made to be heard here and now, with 
an “ay!” for immediate action rather than an eye for speculation. The WaKonongo 
never wondered what their “spiritual” interlocutors looked like and even less what 
ontologically they might be in and for themselves; they only worried about what 
should be done in consequence of what they had been told. In the West, the Virgin 
Mary irst and foremost puts in appearances and what she eventually says (“fast and 
pray”) had already been heard on countless Sunday sermons; in Ukonongo, if the 
spokesperson seized by an Ancestral Spirit could be seen what counted was to heed an 
urgent injunction: “sacriice a black hen or the drought will continue”. The choice made 
by central igures, catholic or pagan, of marginal messengers (often nubile girls) can 
sociologically justiied (Singleton 2009c). 
Moreover, even if (dato non concesso) ancestors were sometimes said to act as 
intermediaries between God and the living (more often than not in answer to pointed 
questioning rather than as echoing spontaneously volunteered information), it was not 
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because they were believed to be knelt contemplatively in His heavenly presence. To 
my knowledge nowhere in pre-Christian Africa was it question of saintly ancestors 
reaping eternal rewards in a divine Heaven or of being everlastingly punished in a 
diabolic Hell for failing to toe the moral line here below. As I see things too (but this 
vision is far from being idiosyncratic – (Singleton 2007; Babalao Olayibi 1993), there 
is even less question in ancestral Africa of a supreme symbol approximating to what 
nineteenth century missionaries called “God” – a being far more redolent of neo-
Thomism and Tridentine catechetics than of the series of igures inally crystalizing in 
the biblical deity (Debray 2001). Whether it is philosophically plausible to speak thus 
a singular substance (a Divine Being naturally knowable independently of supernatural 
revelation) underlying the variegated array of ethnographic evidence is a moot point. 
Less debatable is the fact the earliest generation of explorers3, and missionaries in 
Africa were well aware that what they took to be native religious discourse fell far 
short of what they believed to be true faith in God and the Devil to be. 
2. Respect for religion or religious respect?
My problem with the classical understanding of “ancestor worship” is not that 
anthropologists failed to put their inger on its sociological substance but that, despite 
their thick descriptions of the phenomenon, they continued to categorize and theorize it 
as religion. This was as much an epistemological error as a mistake in categorization. 
For even those who questioned current deinitions of religion in the light of their ield 
material rarely wondered what “deining” as such involved. And yet it is impossible to 
deine what religion is without deciding what “what” itself is! 
Understandings of the real have oscillated between the natural and the nominal. For 
the naturalist, in the last analysis, the really humanly real is what, substantially and 
signiicantly, remains after abstraction have been made of accidental appearances. In 
the same way as the supernaturalist sees the one true God and the one and only Devil 
behind the gods and demons of historical religions and ethnographic monographs, the 
naturalist speaks of Human Nature as essentially identifying human beings no matter 
what their age or sex, their color or their creed, their place in social space or historical 
time. This substantialism has spilled over into the realm of cultural realities. According 
to the naturalist, to live economically, to organize society politically, to marry and to 
worship are amongst the universal and univocal traits of an intrinsically immutable and 
essentially identical human nature. Cultural variations notwithstanding, such things as 
Marriage and Religion are thematic realities naturally recognizable not only in known 
human societies but in any group worthy of this essential and exclusive epithet (it being 
taken for granted that even the most superior of animals is intrinsically inferior to any 
specimen of humanity).
Nominalist anthropologists, on the other hand, have claimed 1. that if Human Rights 
can be defended without invoking the existence of a Human Nature this latter can be 
3  In his journal, Cameron, exploring East and Central Africa, wrote (02.07.1874) that native “ideas of 
religion are nil or next to nil, they believe in spirits and to propitiate them make and wear their images 
and put offerings in little fetish huts. They also have a dim idea of a supreme Being but prayer or praise 
never entered into their thoughts” (Luwel 1976 137).
243Civilisations vol. 63 nos 1-2
From Worshipping Ancestors to Respecting Senior Citizens
erased thanks to Occam’s razor (Singleton 2000); 2. That Marriage is not only an 
optical but an ontological illusion (Needham 1997: 107) at best a common denominator 
generalization applicable to a restricted number of peoples during a limited lapse of 
time – “any universal deinition of marriage is vain” Leach 1961: 105; Needham 1997: 
107); 3. That Religion, likewise, far from being an essential feature of human culture 
is a regional construct. “The methodical isolating out in the whole spectrum of human 
behavior a sector dubbed ‘religious’ has until recently been taken almost dogmatically 
for granted. Of late, however, the conviction that this approach relected reality itself 
has increasingly come under ire (Nicolas 1993: 445).” As a renowned historian had 
already put it (Veyne 1971: 182 – alluding to Eliade and van der Leeuw): “It is with 
some cause for concern that one takes note of books entitled A Treaty on the History 
of Religions or Religious Phenomenology – does this mean that some such thing as 
‘religion’ exists? … Different religions are simply aggregates of phenomena belonging 
to heterogeneous categories none of these amalgamations having the same composition 
as any another.” For the nominalist singular names make suficient sense, for the 
naturalist they are merely labels stuck on the surface of one substantial thing or theme. 
I once made and spaced some shelves in keeping roughly with what I imagined to 
be small, medium and large size books. I would ind ludicrous a suggestion that the 
shelves were more real and relevant than each and every tome and even more grotesque 
the afirmation that these latter were the accidental avatars, the ephemeral expression 
of some substantially archetypal Book. At the most (but to what avail?) in the light 
of some extremely residual or purely heuristic notion of materialized communication 
I could be persuaded that my books (and shelves) represented an intermediary stage 
between prehistoric rock engravings and the electronic devices likely to be implanted 
in the brains of future generations. Likewise, the nominalist is content with arranging 
individual things according to the causes and categories his culture deems presently 
defendable. The (super)naturalist, on the other hand, is intent on giving an absolutely 
(super)natural content to what he takes to be the fundamental facts of human culture 
as such. Hence, amongst other things, his radical rejection of gay marriage and his 
asserting that an atheist is not only implicitly religious but even an anonymous Christian. 
To avoid this tentacular totalitarianism whereby religion grasping at everything 
ends up holding next to nothing, it is a well to ix socio-historic limits to what can, 
with some substantial signiicance, be properly deined as being religious. A graphic 






Both schemas represent an intercultural trip undertaken by an individual actor from 
his terminus a quo to a terminus ad quem embodied by the last in a series of cultures 
manifestly other. The fundamental issue is whether, as depicted in the irst igure, the 
inal “other” is essentially the same as the irst (both and all intermediary cultures being 
supposedly variations on the substantial Sameness of transcultural themes) or whether, 
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as in the second, they are singularly and irreducibly other (Otherness being here of the 
“essence”). 
Elsewhere (Singleton 2011b) I have invited the reader to accompany me on a far 
from ictitious trip (since I have lived and worked in most of the countries and cultures 
traversed) from my native England to my adopted Tanzania via Tunisia and Chad in the 
ield of what at the outset the Western world designates as medical. En route I sought 
relief for a splitting headache from European doctors in France and Italy, from arabo-
muslim marabouts in the Maghreb and their counterparts in the Sahel and on the last 
leg from Bantu waganga. 
The outcome of this safari depends on whether you see reality as artichoke or an 
onion. If you are convinced that whatever their cultures, men have been confronted 
with the same natural diseases, so as not to belittle them you will also conclude that 
they have come up with some at least minimally valid medical solutions. Medicine 
properly so called is represented by the irst triangle on the left. It is heavily shaded 
because close (and increasingly so) to Reality itself (the black, underlying transcultural 
triangle – and transcendent where the Supernatural is concerned). Moving ever further 
to the right, through Chinese acupuncture and Hindu Ayurveda to African magic, 
medicines become increasingly ethnic until, in the end, medical elements are almost 
evanescent. 
The second schema outlines an alternative to this ethnocentrically equivocal 
approach. Seeking to do full justice to the empirical evidence there comes a point where 
there is no longer any point in peeling away triangular traits since you have entered 
a series of worlds whose square coniguration becomes clearly apparent on reaching 
the inal destination and whose general features are represented by the underlying 
unsubstantial square. The absence of what you initially deined as medicine, disease 
and health being illed in this quite other world by the presence of something squarely 
different from your triangle, makes talk of ethno-medicine not only condescending but 
equal to ethnocide (Singleton 2006). Bio-medicine, presently prevailing in the tribal 
homeland of the West, is as ethnic as any other. The African mganga is in no way a 
primitive precursor of the scientiically trained doctor, since it his duty as much to 
make rain or rid you of an enemy as it is to hand you a leaf against your headache. Far 
from being empirically discovered, his materia medica would have been revealed by 
an ancestor and a headache not attributed to some neurophysiological disorder but to 
the ill will of a neighbor. 
Exactly the same kind of trip can be made in the realm initially decreed to be 
religious. It is impossible to travel empty handed. The heavily shaded triangle on the 
left represents not only the baggage any traveler feels he requires but to which at irst 
he has every right. Unless one is mad or masochistic or both, one rightly deems that 
the visions and values of one’s present cultural location are if not absolutely absolute at 
least relatively so – which is not to exclude delocation. A convinced Christian can come 
to believe not only that the Koran is more triangularly religious that the Bible, but that 
triangular truths should be replaced fairly and squarely by post-religious rationality. 
Leaving my English triangle in 1969 to live and work in Ukonongo, I could not 
immediately take leave of the modern suitcase with the compartments in which I had 
packed my Judeo-Christian and Greco-Latin baggage: God and the Pope, Heaven and 
Hell, the body and the soul, metaphysics and morals, the sacred and the profane, nature 
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and culture... to mention but a few of the factors determining my understanding of 
the religious as representing Religion Itself (the Reference represented by the black 
triangle underlying the cultures of the irst schema).
Already in France but especially in Italy, my rather Irish form of Roman Catholicism, 
tinged with the somewhat puritanical Protestantism of Victorian England, came in for 
its irst intercultural shock: the survival of a strong pagan streak in Mediterranean 
Christianity (de Martino 1959). Passing through Islamic Tunisia, I realize that any 
transcultural deinition of religion while perhaps still able to include a monotheistic 
streak will have to shed its trinitarian and incarnational features. After meeting some 
local marabouts in Chad I come to realize why Islamic purists in North Africa speak 
disparagingly of “Islam Noir” since in the Sahel genuine monotheism seems to have 
lost out to ancestral animism. On reaching my destination in Tanzania, the belief 
and behavior of the WaKonongo oblige me to modify and streamline still further 
my deinition of religion if it is to retain any substantial semblance of universal and 
univocal relevance. 
Having realized that my questions about the nature of spirits had never occurred to 
my interlocutors and that in politely replying to my preoccupations the possessed were 
creating from nothing a konongo metaphysic, I soon decided to rely on participant 
observation alone. I thus became convinced that left to themselves the WaKonongo 
showed, little or no interest in God or the Soul, nor did they ever spontaneously 
speculate about First Beginnings or Last Ends. If the WaKonongo had a religion is 
clearly was not centered on what religious beings might be but on what might be in 
it for us humans. Their “gods” seem to have been made for delivering the goods (in 
particular the rain – Singleton 2010) rather than for contemplative communion 
To cut a long story short, it gradually dawned upon me that to all intents and purposes, 
the WaKonongo were as ignorant of and as indifferent to what I called “religion” as 
they were to what I understood by “medicine”. More fundamentally, the WaKonongo 
made me realize that the distinction between Substantially the Same and its accidental 
appearances or cultural variations was if not an onto-epistemolgical mistake at least 
a peculiarly western dichotomy probably induced by the Indo-European linguistic 
distinction between nouns (embodying essences) and verbs (accessorily adding motion 
to the facts). When the WaKonongo had recourse to general terms such as ulozi or 
“sorcery” it was in no way to speak about the substance identiiable in particular 
instances but simply by way of a provisionally heuristic generation: “I am not yet able 
to put a name on the mlozi or sorcerer who has it in for me”. They could speak about the 
wazimu in general but were far more concerned with the muzimu they could name. The 
root (which also igures in kuzimuni, the place where ancestors reside) is used to signify 
uzima – wrongly because restrictively translated as “health” when it meant well-being, 
wholesomeness (the sign of healthy muganga being not only his good health but his 
many wives and cattle). 
Signiicantly (at least if you accept that words are not only things but are largely 
responsible for the things they talk about) there is no word in bantu languages for 
religion (the Swahili-Arabic term dini being now used) and no way of making the 
distinction fundamental in western religion between belief and knowledge. Such 
considerations coupled with the weight of the data collected, inally got the better of 
my preprogrammed presuppositions: rather than having little recognizably religious, at 
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home in their square, the WaKonongo simply did not recognize my triangular religion. 
Consequently labeling their philosophy and practice of ageing according to our religious 
terms as “ancestor worship” is an intolerable form of ethnocentric imperialism. 
Trying to make a universal sense of religion in terms of concrete content having 
proved ethnocentrically impossible, let me propose a heuristic understanding (irst 
presented in Singleton 2003) based etymologically not on “making (substantial) sense” 
(legere) but simply on “being related” (ligare). 
Though fundamentally one should start from the Other, I will begin with Ego 
at the center of the spiral but (as the continuous line purports) with the individual 
member of a whole, bound organically and ontologically to others and not with the 
solipsistic self which Descartes never managed to link with the body let alone society 
and which Rawls and other neoliberal ideologists have idealized as a monad whose 
contacts with others are purely contractual. Homo hierarchicus and not aequalis oblige, 
quantitatively and qualitatively the reciprocal but always asymmetrical relationships 
deining an individual’s network (from close family to neighbors and beyond) diminish 
increasingly until their obligatory or religious character vanishes almost entirely…
1. on the right where one has to do with at the best a stranger and at the worst with 
an enemy who owing you nothing can take everything, your life included.
2. on the left where persons who in theory should be religiously your closest soul 
mates, in practice turn out to be your worst enemies – your mother who as a witch in 
Africa offers you as her entry fee to a coven, the colleague who in your department 
pays reverential respect for your budding ideas but rushes off to publish them under 
his own name.
On leaving the horizontal level of human relationships (taking “human” as deined 
by any given local anthropologic) one encounters the religiously vertical in the shape…
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3. below, of obligations to the para-human (rather than the non – or infra-human) – 
the animal, vegetable and mineral world(s) of the western tradition but which in other 
more animistic traditions act as religious interlocutors – “animism” being deined as 
treating things as if they were persons and consequently as ends and not as means. In 
some cases, the religious spiral is inclusive of almost everything – Descola’s Achuar 
spoke not only to plants but related pebbles to people and thus even more than the 
WaKonongo (Singleton 2001a) religiously ignored what the West identiies as non-
religious Nature. None the less, despite the almost all-inclusive nature of their cultures, 
many people feel that at this bottom level there could be an as yet a-religious Beyond… 
a feeling Drago shared staring out at the desert, and which modern philosophers have 
formalized as the noumenal (Kant), the Es gibt (Heidegger), the il y a (Levinas) and the 
Future (of techno-science and not only science iction) which might lie in store for us: a 
salutary suspicion that the really Real is still to come if not forever beyond our religious 
reach (Singleton 2012). 
4. above, obligations to supra-human interlocutors (some having become of less 
clearly human origin than others). In the irst concentric layer igure the ancestors 
speciic to given groups. When clan A is affected by more than average sickness and 
death, clans B and C will show sympathy, but it is up to the head of A to negotiate a 
satisfactory outcome with the (recently) departed, divined to be responsible. However, 
some issues (such as a lack of rain or game or the menace from marauders or a smallpox 
epidemic (Singleton 1976)) affecting far larger if somewhat loser groupings (a village, 
a “tribe”), solutions must be sought at the level of territorial spirits (Werbner 1977) 
or other such more global chargés d’affaires. Limdimi, the konongo Lord of the 
Forest (Animals) is a typical example of these “superior” partners, many, if not all of 
whom, could be associated with historical but exceptionally human igures such as 
Charlemagne or General Giap4. 
If obligatory reciprocity is its fundamental criterion, then God does not belong to 
the ancestral religion of Africa. Unlike the God of conventional Christianity whom 
the believer can not only contemplate but enter into communion with on earth, the 
deus otiosus of ancestral Africa was aniconic and beyond religious reach: neither priest 
nor temple, the rare apotropaic sacriice being destined to get him back to where he 
belonged and should never have left. When the WaKonongo attributed a death to “God” 
(mauti wa Mungu) far from making a blind act of submissive faith to the mysterious 
ways of divine Providence, they were simply saying that as no sorcerer or ancestor 
could be divined and blamed, the event was inexplicable. A less religious igure than the 
so but badly called “African High God” it would be dificult to imagine! There being at 
some point no religion and even a No! to religion as well as an Ininitely Other beyond 
even a Subsistent Being, would not appear an intolerable paradox to those (post)modern 
4  In a mail (25.11.2012) my colleague and friend François Houtart noted that “ancestor worship was still 
very much alive and well in Vietnam both in catholic and communist circles – its meaning not being 
strictly religious unless in the sense you suggest of being tied up with a somewhat mythical past. Another 
phenomenon is that of the worship of heroes identiied with divinities and possessed of village temples. 
It is thus that general Giap whom I knew and who is still alive has long had temples dedicated to him.” 
In this present article, I have concentrated on lineage ancestors, having treated elsewhere of royal and 
territorial “spirits”. 
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theologians and philosophers who have welcomed the end of religion (Bonheoffer), 
proclaimed the Death of God (Kee) and opted for atheism (Levinas 1971).
3. Ancestral anthropo-logic 
Why and how did it eventually dawn upon me that “ancestor worship” was a 
eurocentric misnomer for a basically pragmatic paradigm of belief and behavior? 
Simply because the WaKonongo told and taught me so. Perhaps because their woodland 
environment far from imposing a constant and cruel struggle for life proved prodigal 
even in dificult times, the WaKonongo, long before Nyerere’s socialist slogan of self-
reliance (kujtegemea), had managed to make ends meet to their satisfaction. Though 
they were as unaware of the fact as we are of the air we breathe, they irmly believed 
that no matter what the problem (shida) – be it repairing a bicycle, making it rain or 
resisting witches – someone, somewhere had the remedy (dawa or uganga – Singleton 
1979)). They spoke about what few, to our minds exotic, rituals they indulged in as 
being all in a day’s work (ni kazi tu). More fundamentally, however, the simple fact of 
working in the ields with them (Singleton 1975) as well as doing ieldwork amongst 
them, made me realize what was really at stake in the phenomena the West classes 
religiously as “ethno-medicine”, “spirit possession” or “ancestor worship”. 
At irst, however, I was somewhat put out by the fact that the local elders (apart from 
WaKamando, all male), occupied center stage and lorded it over all other actors as mere 
extras. Coming from a culture where the retired have taken to behaving retiringly, I was 
taken aback when even the more discrete among my elderly interlocutors automatically 
sat in the middle of the front row for collective photos and took it for granted that the 
best pieces of meat and the irst calabashes of beer be theirs during meals or on festive 
occasions. Though most worked till their dying days, they were forever stopping to 
give peremptory advice even to adults and brooked no quibbling about the sententious 
decisions they delivered during neighborhood palavers. As grandfathers they doted on 
their grandchildren (at least while they were still toddlers), otherwise there was little 
love lost between contiguous generations – no doubt, as once was the case in Europe, 
because sons depended effectively (amongst other things for getting married) not only 
on the goodwill but the very goods of their fathers. 
Initially, to explain why younger people and even elderly women put up with their 
pretentious posturing of senior citizens, I invoked such reasons as uncritical cultural 
inertia, the economic stranglehold exercised by elders or the simple fact that the over 
sixties constituting less than 5% of the demographic pyramid were far more supportable 
than the upper third of the pillar they represent in contemporary western society. Then 
it dawned upon me practically that in certain socio-historic situations, gerontocratic 
ideology and institutions could be synonymous with an aristocratic system, i.e. with, 
in given circumstances, the best way of speculating about and structuring survival be 
psycho-sociological or eco-economic. Widespread in Africa is the story about a young 
king who gets rid of all old people but who in dire straits is saved by the fact that one of 
his minister’s has secretly kept alive and in store his ageing father. Throughout Africa 
too, in addition to tales about tricksters getting the better of the authorities, the elders 
themselves tell tales of young and even infant upstarts bent on upturning the status quo 
but who end by paying a heavy prize for the impertinence of their challenge. 
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But it was the realities of everyday life which made me realize that in certain cultures, 
the older one grows so too increases one’s public usefulness. Since my own existence 
amongst the WaKonongo depended physically and psychologically on this empirical 
evidence, it did not take me long to realize that materially, morally and metaphysically 
the elders had long been absolutely indispensable. They had come to know which soils 
yielded most and where game was likely to hide out; they had accumulated an ever 
deepening experience of the joys and pains of everyday life and had coped reasonably 
well not only with straight forward household and neighborly strife but with troubles 
caused by witches and spirits; and inally they were on the points of returning to the 
ancestral village and were thus well placed to negotiate a satisfactory deal with the 
rightful owners of the rain and the game and other such vital necessities. 
In the eyes of all concerned, being grounded en experience, the respect paid by 
the rising generations to the outgoing one was justiiably in no way seen as usurped. 
It required no arbitrary means of policed enforcement. The mere threat of mystical 
sanctions (such as paternal malediction) was enough to make most actors toe the line – 
the few who dared to cross it knowing they ran the risk not only of public opprobrium 
but punishment at the hands of leopard-men. Hence no one found anything untoward in 
the fact that the opinions and pronunciamento of living elders were almost unfailingly 
heeded or that (as had once been the case with the breadwinners of my youth) patriarchs 
were afforded the best food and drink. Had they been appraised of it, what would have 
surprised the WaKonongo would have been the opposition between what expatriates 
took to be the ceremonial deference shown to the aged and the purportedly religious 
worship of the departed. For they themselves only saw and spoke of a purely formal 
difference of degree and not of an onto-theological divide between politely presenting 
a calabash of beer to a living elder and ceremoniously pouring out a token drop of the 
same beer to the same person – now departed but also at least partly returned home. 
There is no linguistic justiication either for translating in our peculiarly religious 
terms what the WaKonongo and their likes said and did on the occasions described. 
From a purely phenomenological point of view it was a question of ceremony but not of 
ritual, of exchange but not of sacriice, of negotiation but not of prayer, of interlocutors 
but not of spirits, of plenipotentiaries and not of intermediaries. 
The inexistence of “ancestor worship” in some societies and its disappearance from 
others, conirms it underlying sociological nature. If, as Mary Douglas would have put 
it (1974), “ancestor worship” is absent from Pygmy bands and Hippy communes as is 
witchcraft, it is because this kind of culture lives in the present without any apodictic 
reference to an ancestral past and without any authoritative asymmetry between old and 
young, male and female and because should conlict rear its ugly head, those concerned 
can simply take their leave, going to live with another band or commune. 
Human phenomena rise and fall in keeping not so much with “religious” speculation 
as with social structures. If “ancestor worship” is about religion it is in the relational 
sense we have given to the term and relations vary (and consequently religion) according 
to social shape and size. Hence, when intergenerational interests conlict rather than 
converge, “ancestor worship” having come adrift of its sociological anchorage, socio-
pathology can prevail until young and old manage to relate once again respectfully in 
an empirically justiiable fashion – as I was to during ield trip to the Congo in 1986. 
In the same way that parish priests were wont to call upon the services of religious 
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congregations to reactivate the lagging spirits of their locks (crosses commemorating 
theses missions can still be seen in rural areas), African villagers too could invite teams 
specialized in cleansing communities of stultifying stress. These initiatives usually took 
the form of anti-witchcraft campaigns during which those (often the elders) deemed 
particularly responsible for the deteriorating climate were “encouraged” to confess 
their excessive demands and to destroy the objects materializing them (Singleton 
2009a). Conviviality thus restored, in pre-colonial times the local community was able 
to continue business as usual. However, with the advent of colonial times, the ittest 
on whom social survival depended were no longer entirely and evidently the elders. 
Know-how (together with the power, the prestige and the proits it entailed) became 
at least partly and often rapidly the prerogative of the rising generation. In the West, 
the unintended and unwanted side effects of this socio-economically induced shift in 
the balance of power between generations were mitigated by such factors as supra-
familial social security (both for young and old) and by the elderly being enabled at 
once to re-identify themselves as a group (“Grey Panthers”!) and to reinvent a relevant 
intergenerational role. 
Unfortunately the absence of such safety valves in the Congolese villages I studied in 
(Singleton 1986) had led to social pressure building up to exploding point. From being 
a factor of integration “ancestor worship” had degenerated into the most disintegrating 
form of witchcraft. On the one hand, failing to realize that power now depended as 
much if not more on mastering the unknown future than on repeating the established 
past, the elders continued to claim the respect and rewards which had until recently 
been rightfully theirs. On the other, to escape being devoured (materially or mystically) 
by their village elders, those young people who could, led to safer urban havens, 
abandoning en route the ritual trappings of an ancestor worship which had forfeited its 
sociological raison d’être. Unfortunately too, failing to realize the underlying causes 
responsible for this hardening of the social categories by the elders (such as the absence 
of private or public pensions, palliative care, unemployment beneits) some analysts 
and activists spoke rather glibly of “social pathology” and somewhat one-sidedly 
promoted the rights of youth (Cambron 2007). 
4. From symbol to sacrament 
I am, of course, not the irst anthropologist to imply that “ancestor worship” is 
simply a symbolization of seniority, leaving the burden to prove more on the shoulders 
of those seeking something more religious. However, given the tendency for a symbol 
to be taken as a somewhat supericial sign for something deeply signiicant in itself, I 
prefer to speak of the ceremonious respect for senior citizens once a key factor in the 
survival of village life in Africa, as a genuine sacrament. For it was at once expressive of 
but also by that very fact effective (ex opere operato) of the intergenerational language 
and logic appropriate to and appropriated by the milieu typical of ancestral Africa. 
Times have changed. Sociohistorically speaking it is unrealistic to dream of a literal 
return to the traditionally justiied forms respect. On the other hand, sociologically 
speaking it would be anarchically unrealistic to aim at dispensing with all formalities: 
a completely symmetrical equality between the generations would be an atopian 
nightmare and not a utopian dream. As of now, supposing that the ceremonious to be 
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credible requires continuity with concrete conditions, a fresh sacramentalization of the 
emerging intergenerational relations or religion is called for. Speaking as one of them: 
Long life to senior citizens!
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